FALLACIES OF MORAL
REASONING
Fallacies of moral reasoning are
logically incorrect ways of reasoning that attempt to persuade emotionally or
psychologically. During classroom
discussions and in issue-related essays, we will labor to identifying and
exposing such fallacies, in the positions articulated in our readings, in-class
during our discussions, as well as in our written work.
Study the following fallacies and be
ready to identify them when you see or hear them:
I. Ambiguity: When we use a word or phrase
in such a way that it is not clear, or can be taken in more than one way.
II. Genetic Fallacies: These
are called "abusive" because they attack the something about the
source "or genesisÓ of the argument, instead of dealing with the merits of
the argument itself. E.g.: saying
a proposal "smacks of socialism" is not dealing with the proposal
itself. It is always fallacious to attack an argument because of its source.
III. Ad hominem (is Latin for
"to the man"): This
attacks the person instead of the person's argument. E.g.: In response to somebody saying they didn't feel right
about participating in a demonstration against discrimination, some one
responded, "You're a fascist without any moral sense, you just want to
perpetuate racism." Or if an
energy consultant accused opponents of a nuclear power plant of being
"wild-eyed fanatics." Or
is it is said that anyone who opposes administration policy is a
"communist dupe."
A. Such tactics are often
successful in drawing attention away from reasoned arguments.
IV. Invincible ignorance:
Insists on the legitimacy of an idea despite contradictory facts. The phrase "I don't care what you
say" is a dead giveaway.
E.g., "It doesn't matter what anybody thinks, abortion is
wrong."
V. Questionable Claim: is a statement that cannot stand up to
scrutiny, because it is too broad a claim. Superlatives (phrases including adjectives or adverbs like always,
never, best, worst) are often indicators of questionable claims.
A. E.g., Every time someone
is executed, violent crime decreases, therefore, capital punishment works. (Or even): Executions reduce crime is
an empirically questionable claim.
VI. Straw Man: Changing another personÕs position/argument into a form
that is easier to attack. (The
metaphor is about setting up a "straw man" argument and then knocking
it down.)
VII. Is
/ Ought: Trying to derive a moral statement from a factual statement. Assuming because something is, it ought
to be.
VIII. Inconsistency:
Contradicting oneÕs own argument.
IX. Begging the question:
answering the question with a question or a variation of the same
question; or just assuming that a statement what must be proved is true, in
such a way as to make it seem more plausible.
A. Circular arguments: e.g. How
do you know God exists? Because
the Bible says so. How do you know
the Bible speaks truth? Because it
is inspired by God.
X. Argument from ignorance: Insists a argument is true unless it is
proved false, or false until proved true.
"Since there is no clear evidence that [someone] knew about the
bribe, he must be innocent."
XI. Appeal to authority:
A. 80% of Americans polled
are against abortion, so it clearly is wrong.
B. The President has more
information than we do, so he must have good reason for his decision.
XII. Provincialism:
Sees things exclusively through the eyes of one's own group, organization, nation,
etc. (Most moral arguments that
emphasize the protection of one's own preferred group fall into this fallacy.)
XIII. Hasty
conclusion: Moral conclusions based on insufficient evidence:
A. E.g., conclusions based on
anecdotal instead of thoroughly researched views of the facts. Often includes a failure to consider
pertinent and available science.
XIV. Two wrongs
make a right: Everybody is doing it.
The statement to the cop: Why don't you chase and ticket that other
vehicle – it was going faster than I was.
XV. Fallacies
of Faulty Causation:
A. Causal oversimplification:
Correlation does not = causation.
Association does not mean that something has a causal impact.
B. Slippery slope: if one particular undesirable thing happens, it
will inevitably lead to an even worse consequence, will lead to yet another
worse consequence, and so on, on a Òslippery slopeÓ to some horror. It is the
inevitability of the assumption that is fallacious; these are also forms of the
questionable claim fallacy.
1. E.g.: If you take that
first drink you will become a destitute drunk.
For more sites about
fallacies:
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/
http://web.carroll.edu/~msmillie/General/errsinmorlreasg.htm
Consider,
also, these thoughts from ÒMoral
Reasoning in Applied EthicsÓ by the philosopher Keith Allen Korcz, at http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~kak7409/MoralReasoning.html.
Korcz concluded his reflection with these thoughts:
What is the point of moral
reasoning? Well, we can think of moral reasoning as a tool and, like any tool,
there are lots of ways it can be used.
One thing it can be used for is
discovering truths. People who use moral reasoning to try to discover truths
begin with a certain view about morality. One component of that view is that
there are moral truths to begin with. A second component is that moral truths,
like truths about math or physics, can be discovered by careful reasoning and,
in some cases, in part by observing the way things are in the world.
Note that using moral reasoning
to discover moral truths is different from using moral reasoning to persuade
others that their moral claims are correct. Someone can try to discover a moral
truth simply for the sake of satisfying their own curiosity or contributing to
scholarship in the field without trying to convince everyone that they are
correct. This is the same sort of thing a biologist trying to understand the
genetic code of an obscure snail might be trying to do. The biologist isn't
trying to persuade the world at large about snails; rather the goal is to
contribute to the scholarship of biology and/or satisfy his or her own
curiosity.
Moral philosophers try to
influence public opinion on moral issues about as frequently as biologists try
to influence public opinion, which is to say, not very often. Many
professionals feel that moral philosophers, biologists and such are failing to
fulfill a professional responsibility when they don't do a good job of
informing the public about the results of their research. For instance, some
biologists have criticized their own profession for failing to adequately
inform the public that research has established that the evolution of species
is a fact accepted by virtually all competent professionals in the field, with
the result that, for example, 47% of adult Americans polled in 1993 favored creationism
over evolution.2 Aside from whether the critics are right, the point is that
the vast majority of what professional philosophers do has nothing to do with
trying to change the views of the public at large.
It is possible to try to use
moral reasoning to persuade the public at large, but such argumentation is
unlikely to be effective. One reason for this is that moral reasoning is aimed
at proving or disproving claims, and claims are things which are believed. But
a person's beliefs, the social psychologists tell us, have little to do with
their behavior. Some studies have found that a person's expressed beliefs are
likely to account for less than 10% of their behavior. Rather, our behavior is
far more influenced by emotions and social pressures, many of which we are not
even aware.
Of course, many people,
especially those who are well educated, do at least make an attempt to believe
according to reason. But even they are highly vulnerable to various social
pressures and emotions. When we are influenced by these pressures and emotions,
we often respond to reasoned argumentation by trying to avoid the issue or
change the subject, by nodding and agreeing with a claim we think is false in
order to avoid conflict, by appealing to clichŽs (e.g., "Everyone has a
right to their own opinion"), or even by getting angry. We all, on one
occasion or another, convince ourselves that these kinds of defense mechanisms
are justified and correct, rather than realizing that what we have done is
simply ignored the issues in question.
In short, moral reasoning will
not change the world. At best, it will persuade a few persons who either don't
have a strong emotional investment in the issue in question, or who can keep
their reasoning and emotional lives sufficiently separated to recognize the
merits of a good argument. This may seem like a very small thing to achieve,
but if those whose opinions you can change are those whose opinions you deeply
respect, the results can be quite rewarding.
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Essay Guidelines